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A B S T R A C T
The recent food crisis in Malawi has drawn stark attention to the failures of
development policies over the last forty years to create wealth and develop a
robust economy or the markets on which such an economy must depend. Current
market liberalisation policies have achieved at best mixed success in addressing
the generic problems inhibiting smallholder agricultural development : low re-
turns to farmers’ and service providers’ investments, with high risks from natural
shocks, price variations, coordination failure and opportunistic behaviour. Post-
independence institutional mechanisms in Malawi were more successful in ad-
dressing some of these problems, in particular those of coordination risk, although
external and internal diﬃculties led to increasing costs and declining eﬀectiveness
of these mechanisms, and to their collapse. They do provide, however, important
lessons about the diﬀerent failures of both market intervention and market lib-
eralisation policies. We suggest and discuss a set of critical elements needed for
economic development and wealth creation in poor rural areas, and propose four
basic principles to guide the search for, and design and implementation of, eﬀective
rural development strategies and policies.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Along with a number of other southern Africa countries, Malawi entered
2002 in acute crisis with a looming famine. The causes of this crisis may
appear more obvious in other countries, such as war-torn Angola and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but we need to dig deeper to ask
why relatively mild weather shocks (as compared, for example, with the
1991/92 drought) triggered such a crisis. Devereux (2002) has provided an
excellent and detailed examination of the processes and immediate causes
of the food shortages in Malawi in early 2002, but as he recognises, there
remain underlying questions regarding the vulnerability of the rural econ-
omy to production shocks, and the institutional capacity (of government,
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markets and other actors) to respond to and manage the eﬀects of such
shocks. This paper addresses these questions, focusing on the situation in
Malawi. Despite the single country focus of this discussion, we suggest that
our analysis is relevant to the process of development in poor rural areas in
other parts of Africa and in South Asia. However, in drawing lessons for
other areas, due attention needs to be paid to diﬀerences in, for example,
agricultural technologies and opportunities, local and national institutions,
infrastructure and communications, and non-farm opportunities. Our
analysis assumes, in particular, the existence of more intensive and pro-
ductive agricultural technologies which suit local agro-ecology, even if
their adoption is constrained by market and institutional failures. We
suggest that more intensive maize technologies can ﬁll this role in most of
Malawi, but recognise that, for more arid areas in southern Africa, this is
not the case.
Malawi is a very poor country:2 the national poverty rate was estimated
at 65% in 1998, and gross national income per capita in 2002 was esti-
mated at $US 160, down from $US 200 in 1990. The economy is re-
markably open: trade was 72% of national income in 2002, compared to
57% in 1990. There is a high dependence on foreign aid, at $US 38 per
capita in 2001, although aid ﬂows have fallen signiﬁcantly in very recent
years as donors have been unable to fully disburse committed funds
(World Bank 2003), because government has fallen out of compliance with
mutually agreed strategies. The urbanisation rate is about 15% and de-
pendence on agriculture, estimated at 39% of GDP in 2002, is notably
high and little changed from an estimated 41% in 1982. It is thought that
agriculture’s share in national income has increased in the last ﬁve years or
so, but this is less a consequence of agricultural growth than a result of
continuing contraction in the industrial and service sectors, the latter
probably being linked to declining aid disbursements. Presently, the in-
vestment rate is pitiful : 9% of GDP in 2002, compared with 23% in 1990.
There are a few bright spots in the last decade, with major improvements
in primary school enrolment and its gender balance, and substantial falls
in infant and under-ﬁve mortality (though these are still very high, with the
under-ﬁve mortality rate falling from 253 to 183 per 1,000 live births be-
tween 1985 and 2001).
We begin with an examination of generic problems facing poor rural
areas in Malawi. Understanding these problems allows us to identify
critical issues that need to be addressed. This provides us with an ana-
lytical framework to consider ways in which ﬁrst the post-independence
policy regime and then a subsequent liberalisation policy regime have
addressed, and then failed to address, these issues. We conclude by asking
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‘Where next? ’, and suggest some principles for formulating new national
and rural policies.
G E N E R I C P R O B L E M S A N D ‘ S Y S T E M I C I N V E S T M E N T R I S K S’
I N P O O R R U R A L A R E A S
This section describes in a stylised manner some generic problems fac-
ing poor rural areas in Malawi, also widely observed in neighbouring
countries, and which impact on the lives of large numbers of people.
Recognising the complexity and multiple dimensions of the problems in
these areas, and of their causes, discussion focuses on a particular set of
problems that increase risks and inhibit productive investments.
Perhaps the deﬁning characteristics of rural areas in Malawi are very
low and fragile incomes and consequently market activity based on very
small transactions. For a long time the rural economy, and (directly and
indirectly) people’s livelihoods within that economy, have been dependent
upon two principal activities : agriculture and migrant labour remittances
and returnee savings (see e.g. Morton 1975 ; Kydd & Christiansen 1982).
Both of these sectors have faced major setbacks over the last thirty years,
and although petty trading activity in rural areas has increased markedly
in recent years (see e.g. Orr & Orr 2002), this is mainly a response to the
decline of traditional sources of income rather than to a growing local
consumer market, and monetisation in the rural economy remains very
low (Ellis et al. 2002).
Recent statistics on smallholder production are controversial, with some
sources suggesting that agriculture has been growing at a tremendous pace
(for example at over 7% per annum in the 1990s, World Bank 2001), based
largely on a (conjectural) explosion of cassava production. These estimates
are not credible (although unfortunately they frequently crop up in
literature onMalawi), but there is continuing debate about some growth in
root crops (cassava and sweet potatoes). It can be said with reasonable
certainty that smallholder maize production has stagnated. Meanwhile
smallholder production of burley tobacco and minor cash crops (such as
paprika, birds eye chillies and pigeon peas) has increased (see e.g. Orr &
Mwale 2001), but these are grown by a minority of farming households.
Meanwhile commercial estate agriculture is in crisis, with very few crops
in which it is able to make proﬁts.3 Maize is the dominant food crop and
current stagnation in maize production contrasts with, and is a regression
from, an earlier ‘emerging green revolution’ with rapidly expanding
growth in smallholders’ fertiliser use and hybrid maize production in some
areas in the 1980s (Carr 1997; Heisey & Smale 1996).
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Migrant labour opportunities had not only been available inter-
nationally, but had developed rapidly in the domestic economy in the
1970s with the growth of tobacco estates (Kydd & Christiansen 1982). Both
international and domestic labour migration have been subject to diﬀering
combinations of long-term declines and recent shocks, as a result of varied
processes which included: opening of previously protected domestic
industries to regional and international competition; declining commodity
prices ; a switch from estate to smallholder burley tobacco production
(as discussed in note 2) ; failures in parastatals and in privatisation
processes ; political instability ; economic mismanagement; lack of inves-
tor conﬁdence; and tightening of controls on international migration.
The result is declining opportunities for rural households to ﬁnd jobs
elsewhere, and, for those households with members in employment,
reductions in job security, net incomes and ability to save and remit
incomes.
A third major source of income in rural areas that is more diﬃcult to
quantify is income from direct (i.e. non-agricultural) use of natural re-
sources (e.g. Cavendish 1999 for Zimbabwe). While this undoubtedly re-
mains important in the livelihoods of many rural people in Malawi,
particularly in supporting coping strategies of poorer households (e.g.
Fisher et al. 2002), it does not provide a basis for expanding incomes and
welfare, it is threatened in many places by increasing population densities,
and it faces important problems of crowding in and covariant risk with
agricultural and agriculturally dependent activities.
One response by rural people to pressure on and declining oppor-
tunities from agricultural, migrant and natural resources incomes has been
to try to diversify into other activities (Bryceson 1999). A major diﬃculty in
the context of the faltering of the traditional drivers of growth has been the
lack of opportunities with low capital and skill demands and low risks,
apart from petty trading, which has low barriers to entry but oﬀers low
returns (see e.g. Ellis et al. 2002).
Concentration of incomes from a narrow range of risky and low pro-
ductivity activities is exacerbated by poor infrastructure, services and
communications, with poor roads and transport services and poor tele-
communications, leading to high costs in physical movement of goods and
services in and out of rural areas, together with high costs of communi-
cation about market opportunities and prices. Education and literacy,
particularly among women, also tend to be low, and long-standing prob-
lems of very poor health have been exacerbated by the spread of HIV/
AIDS.4 Health and education services, meanwhile, are stretched and often
underresourced and ineﬀective, undermined themselves by the impact of
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HIV/AIDS, limited human resources, ﬁscal constraints, remoteness and
often ineﬀective management.
The result of the low general level of economic activity, of the risks
from lack of diversiﬁcation, and of poor communications is thin markets,
i.e. very low traded volumes of key commodities, manufactures and services
(examples of these categories being: agricultural produce, agricultural
inputs and agricultural ﬁnance). Thin markets are both a cause and a
consequence of the fact that while volumes traded are low, the costs and
risks of trading are high. Underlying factors include high communication
costs, the fact that these high costs are carried by very low volumes, and
the combination of low and risk-prone volumes with poor and costly in-
formation services, leading to high risks of transaction failure for buyers
and sellers. This requires high risk premiums and margins to make it
proﬁtable to engage in markets, but these high margins themselves depress
demand, and the result is a low level equilibrium trap5 and market failure
(Dorward et al. 2004). These problems are particularly acute in input,
output and ﬁnancial markets needed for the intensiﬁcation of seasonal
food crop production, notably for maize, the overwhelmingly dominant
staple food.
To examine how these problems might be overcome, we need to con-
sider in more detail the particular risks facing rural inhabitants and other
investors or potential investors in these rural economies. We identify four
basic categories of risk that inhibit productive investments necessary to
promote economic growth and wealth creation in poor rural areas : risks of
natural shocks ; price risks ; economic coordination risks ; and risks of
opportunism. We term the problem that these risks pose the ‘systemic
investment risks ’ of poor rural areas, as these areas face a particularly
intractable set of development problems due to the high risks that investors
face in all four risk categories.
Low levels of ﬁnancial and physical capital, together with reliance on
agriculture and natural resources, make poor rural economies and liveli-
hoods particularly exposed and vulnerable to risks of natural shocks. These
may arise from adverse weather (aﬀecting crop yields or damaging
physical assets) ; human, crop or animal disease ; or physical insecurity (as a
result of crime, political violence or conﬂict). Where markets are thin and
there are poor communications and high transport costs, isolated markets
are prone to large price risks when aﬀected by local supply or demand
shocks. This may be particularly problematic for food crops which have
relatively inelastic demand, and where there are large diﬀerences between
local import and export parity prices (as is the case for Malawi). There is a
long-standing literature on the existence and eﬀects of such risk for poor
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rural livelihoods, and on ways that poor rural people attempt to reduce
their exposure to it.
While we recognise the importance of these shocks, our primary focus
here is to draw attention to two transaction risks that have not been given
enough consideration by development policy analysts. These transaction
risks may not be as obvious as the natural shocks and price risks discussed
above, but they can nevertheless have devastating eﬀects on the returns to
investments, and hence on investment ﬂows. First we consider economic
coordination risk, which is the risk of failure of one player’s investment due to
the possible absence of complementary investments by other players in
diﬀerent stages in the supply chain. In developed economies these risks
have been examined in a seminal work by Williamson (1985) and in sub-
sequent new institutional economics writings on transaction costs and
contractual arrangements. There has been less work on this problem in
developing economies ( Jaﬀee & Morton 1995; Dorward et al. 1998).
It is not generally recognised that the problems of speciﬁc assets as
deﬁned by Williamson are a special case of a more general problem of thin
markets which, as argued above, are a systemic problem in poor rural
areas. When the returns to an investment are dependent upon comp-
lementary actions in a very thin market, any investment is subject to the
risk that either no other actor will make the necessary complementary
actions (economic coordination risk), or that an actor who could make
such actions has an eﬀective monopoly and is able to capture an undue
share of the revenue in the supply chain. The latter is an example of the
second type of transaction risk that we need to consider, risk of opportunism
by other players. Risks of opportunism not only arise where there are thin
markets, but may also occur where there are weak institutions protecting
contracting parties from opportunism, or where there is strong infor-
mation asymmetry (for example where the quality of goods or services is
diﬃcult for buyers to judge). However, thin markets lead to important
additional risks of opportunism.
Economic coordination risks, and associated risks of opportunism, are
particularly problematic in poor rural areas, with their very low levels of
economic activity, poor transport and thin markets. In the development of
markets needed to support more intensive crop production in poor rural
areas, for example, there are extensive economic coordination risks facing
diﬀerent investors required in the supply chain: ﬁnancial service pro-
viders, input suppliers, farmers, produce traders and transporters. Thus
returns to farmers’ borrowings to purchase inputs are dependent on ac-
cess to inputs (subsequent to borrowing), and on access to produce
markets (subsequent to production) ; returns to ﬁnancial service providers’
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investment in agricultural lending are dependent on farmers’ demand and
subsequent repayments (which depend upon input suppliers and produce
buyers) ; returns to input suppliers’ investments in stock and marketing
systems are dependent on farmers’ subsequent access to and uptake of
seasonal ﬁnance and access to transport services ; produce traders’ invest-
ments in buying systems and purchases are dependent on farm production
and access to transport services ; and investments in transport services are
dependent on demand from input and produce traders and on road
maintenance and access. Similarly, the diﬀerent players face risks of
opportunistic behaviour by other players : lenders are at risk from ‘strategic
default ’ by farmers ; farmers are at risk from low prices oﬀered by maize
traders at harvest time (when farmers are desperate for cash) or in remote
areas (where farmers have no other sales outlets) ; farmers are at risk from
input sellers supplying poor quality or adulterated inputs, and from use of
inaccurate or loaded weights and measures by input or produce traders ;
farmers and traders with commodities requiring urgent transport may also
be vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by individual transporters or by
transporters’ cartels.
We have not explored the full range of possible coordination links that
exist (we might, for example, also consider the need for extension services
to promote input use or crop production, or for law enforcement to pre-
vent theft or loan defaults). Nevertheless, the importance of coordination
risk should be apparent, as failure by any one investor in the supply chain
(or failure by a suﬃcient number of farmers to generate breakeven volumes
for other parties) will cause their investments to fail. Furthermore, as
willingness to invest is determined by expectations of returns, and the
returns to investments depend upon investments by others, the returns to
investments of all players are subject to each others’ expectations of re-
turns. It only takes one investor to withdraw because of perceptions of high
risks of shocks, prices, coordination failure or opportunism, for all other
investors to lose their shirts. It is important to recognise the critical role of
expectations and trust in perceptions of coordination risks.
All these categories of risk lower the productivity of the rural economy
by (a) directly lowering the average returns to investment within the
economy; (b) distorting investments within the rural economy away from
those that maximise expected returns towards those that reduce risks under
adverse conditions ; and (c) discouraging investments within the rural
economy as a result of both reduced expected returns and risk aversion of
investors. Overcoming systemic investment risks therefore requires a
lowering of risk and a raising of expected secure returns to a level that
provides opportunities for productive investments that both promise and
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deliver returns suﬃcient to attract investors and drive economic growth.
Attention therefore needs to be paid to reducing risks from coordination
failure ; reducing risks from shocks ; reducing price risks ; reducing risks
from opportunism; and raising minimum expected returns (allowing for
premia needed to oﬀset risks). Diﬀerent risks may be traded oﬀ against
each other and against expected returns, so that investment decisions will
be made allowing for risk-return criteria across all four conditions. Eﬀec-
tive policy will concentrate on reducing the exposure to and eﬀects of the
largest risks. In contrast to well-developed economies with rich competi-
tive markets, where players can generally be conﬁdent that the market will
provide coordination, poor rural areas with thin markets require particu-
lar attention to problems of coordination failure and price risk and,
initially at least, development of non-market coordination mechanisms to
reduce these risks. We therefore turn now to consider how these problems
have been addressed under diﬀerent recent policy regimes.
P O S T- I N D E P E N D E N C E ‘ I N S T I T U T I O N A L F I X E S’
Institutions have, rightly, been receiving increasing attention in develop-
ment policy. New institutional economics commonly distinguishes be-
tween ‘ institutional arrangements ’ and the ‘ institutional environment’
(Davis & North 1971). The former refers to the means by which people
attempt to overcome the challenges of transacting in a particular context,
some aspects of which have been sketched above in the case of rural
Malawi. The latter refers to the broader features of the transactions en-
vironment, such as the accountability of government; the extent of prop-
erty rights and their enforcement ; access to and reliability of diﬀerent
kinds of information; and the balance between laws and policies which
facilitate the extraction of rents versus those which encourage competition
and new investment. ‘Economic coordination’ sits between these two cat-
egories, as it involves private business arrangements, government action
(or where not intervening, a ‘government stance’) and possibly collective
action by businesses. The recent interest by development agencies in
institutionalism (e.g. World Bank 2002) has tended to focus on the ‘ in-
stitutional environment’ and on the importance of governance, com-
munications infrastructure, legal systems and property rights in supporting
the development of competitive markets. In contrast, new institutional
economics has been able to show that institutional arrangements arise
as speciﬁc responses to particular context-speciﬁc challenges in transact-
ing and economic coordination, modiﬁed by power relations between
the contracting parties. Thus analysis and evaluation of alternative
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institutional arrangements at a given stage of development raise major
practical questions : where arrangements are patently unsatisfactory and
could realistically be improved, do the fundamental causes of failure to im-
prove result primarily from matters of power, of ideology, or of knowl-
edge? Answers to such questions will often be based more on practical
experience of ‘what works ’ than on more abstract conceptual analysis.
Malawi’s post-independence history provides an interesting set of
examples of the interplay of these issues. For thirty years, from the early
1960s to the early 1990s, Malawi pursued a broadly consistent approach to
building institutional arrangements and coordination mechanisms for
rural development, subsequently abandoning this for a much less inter-
ventionist approach. While power and ideology are important elements of
this story, we focus on more pragmatic processes of trial and error that
led to the development of institutional arrangements and coordination
mechanisms within the broad ideologies and structural relations dominant
in Malawi at diﬀerent times during this period.
Malawi, like many other African countries, extended and deepened
the system of monopolistic marketing parastatals established in the pre-
independence period, channelling substantial foreign aid towards investing
in the parastatal infrastructure. There were strong political and economic
reasons for newly independent governments establishing or continuing
with and extending the activities of these parastatals. Governments needed
to take action, and to be seen to take action, to promote agricultural and
rural development, but the private sector was weak (as regards access to
capital and human resources, and in organisational capacity), and the
poor market and infrastructural development in rural areas presented
highly risky and unattractive investment opportunities, as discussed above.
At the same time, there was implicit recognition of the major coordination
challenges facing private investors in smallholder agriculture. State inter-
vention was seen as a means of addressing all these problems, in that it
could provide a coordination mechanism across trading, infrastructural,
research and extension investments and activities ; it could access oﬃcial
ﬁnance sources ; it could coordinate with farmers ; and it could invest in
the organisational and human resource development necessary to develop
working systems.6 At the level of macroeconomic policies, government
policies to ﬁx exchange rates and control agricultural markets allowed
price stabilisation and price setting to reduce price risk to farmers and to
set ﬁnance, input and output prices to give risk-adjusted returns high
enough to attract investments in intensiﬁed crop production, at least by
better-oﬀ smallholders. Pan-territorial pricing allowed these beneﬁts to
extend even to remote rural areas. At its height, this approach led to the
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integrated rural development projects of the 1970s and 1980s, extending
coordination into health, education and roads as well as agricultural re-
search and extension, input supply, crop marketing and seasonal ﬁnance.
The parastatal system can therefore be seen as a speciﬁc ‘ institutional
ﬁx’ (Kydd et al. 2001) that enabled governments to address the ﬁve in-
vestment risk trap problems identiﬁed earlier : risks from coordination
failure ; risks from shocks ; price risks ; risks from opportunism; and low
expected returns. Focusing on the problems facing farmers, governments
took on the task of coordinating investments to provide the ﬁnancial and
input and output marketing services farmers needed. By committing
themselves to this task, undertaking investments themselves, and control-
ling and stabilising prices, government took on the risks involved in
developing and delivering these services, encouraged coordinated com-
mitment by farmers, and took over price risks from farmers. Coordination
across credit provision and recovery, input supplies and crop marketing
also allowed the development of mechanisms to reduce incentives for
farmers to default on loans, and thus reduce risks of opportunism. This was
an important basis for the very high loan repayment rates achieved in
Malawi as compared, for example, with Zambia and Zimbabwe where the
political economy did not take advantage of this feature of the system.7
As is well known, parastatals in Africa have a mixed record. Some
have supported, at diﬀerent times, large increases in maize production in
more favoured maize growing areas, a growth dynamic in some rural
areas, and national (though not household) food security. Where present,
however, these gains were achieved at considerable cost, and parastatals
were often ineﬃcient, ineﬀective monopolies and state organs of patron-
age and agricultural taxation. In Malawi ADMARC operated for a
number of years with commendable eﬃciency, and the Smallholder
Agricultural Credit Authority maintained for many years an outstanding
repayment record on farmer lending.8 However, cross subsidisation from
cash crops to maize depressed smallholder cash crop production and earn-
ings and became increasingly diﬃcult to ﬁnance, and this led to a steady
decline in its eﬀectiveness. Direct beneﬁts tended to accrue to better-oﬀ
farmers in more favoured areas (as regards lower land pressure and more
reliable climate), and by-passed more challenged rural areas where large
numbers of the rural poor are located.9 The longer-run sustainability of
this institutional model was also undermined by an increasing tendency to
rely on state and party power to command top-down coordinated action,
rather than positive incentives rooted in players’ perceived self-interests.
However, these problems should not mask the institutional problems
that many African parastatals addressed, nor the successes that, as in
352 ANDREW DORWARD AND J ONATHAN KYDD
Malawi, they sometimes achieved in addressing these problems. In par-
ticular, their record needs to be judged against the achievements of the
liberalised markets that succeeded them and to which we now turn.
L I B E R A L I S A T I O N
There is an extensive literature describing the diﬀerent processes of lib-
eralisation in Malawi and its neighbours (see e.g. Chilowa 1998; Deininger
& Olinto 2000; Jayne et al. 2002; Jayne & Jones 1997; Kherallah &
Govindan 1999), and we will do no more here than describe their broad
eﬀects and relate them to the investment coordination and risk problems
of poor rural areas. There continues to be considerable debate about the
eﬀects of liberalisation, largely due to diﬃculties (a) in establishing counter-
factuals as regards the eﬀects of alternative policies to liberalisation; (b)
in agreeing how far liberalisation has been achieved, and whether con-
tinuing problems are the result of too little or too much liberalisation; and
(c) in separating the eﬀects of diﬀerent elements of liberalisation and of
other simultaneous changes, in, for example, national governance and
international markets (Dorward et al. 2004; Jayne et al. 2002; Kherallah
et al. 2000; Orr & Mwale 2001). It is, however, generally agreed that by the
late 1980s the parastatal system was unsustainable, as it was becoming
increasingly ineﬃcient and ineﬀective, and imposed growing ﬁscal de-
mands on government. By pulling back the state from commitments to
carry investment, price and exchange risk, liberalisation solved some
problems, removing the price distortions and operational ineﬃciency of
state managed systems, reducing ﬁscal strain, and reducing scope for rent
seeking. Positive developments noted in Malawi’s neighbours included
beneﬁts for maize consumers from competition in maize processing, with
expansion of local hammer mills and reduced transport and processing
costs ( Jayne & Jones 1997), and the development of successful private
institutional arrangements supporting smallholder production of certain
cash crops (e.g. cotton, Gordon & Goodland 2000).
As regards maize crop production, however, liberalisation has failed to
solve the challenges of high cost and patchy service delivery. Instead these
services have largely disappeared. Investment in ﬁnancial and input ser-
vice delivery, in produce trading, and in farm production has withered
away, as private sector investment has not replaced the parastatal system
that aspired to support rural investment in maize production. Not un-
expectedly, rural economies are now caught in a low equilibrium trap
created by systemic investment risks which render the necessary invest-
ments unattractive. Farmers face an absence of ﬁnancial services and large
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uncertainty about maize prices and hence risks as regards proﬁtability of
investments in maize production. Rural ﬁnanciers face problems of
widespread borrower opportunism and strategic default, with limited
investment opportunities for borrowers, against very high interest rates.
Input traders face low eﬀective demand, and output traders face low
and uncertain supply. Consumers also face very uncertain maize prices,
making it dangerous to diversify out of maize production into other more
proﬁtable farm or non-farm activities (Dorward 1999; Orr & Orr 2002).
All investors also face high degrees of uncertainty from macroeconomic
instability (with rapidly changing exchange rates and inﬂation, and high
interest rates), and from often erratic government and donor policies and
interventions aﬀecting food and other markets.
W H E R E N E X T? C R I T I C A L I S S U E S
It is relatively easy to identify failures in both the post-independence
market intervention and the more recent market liberalisation prescrip-
tions ; a more diﬃcult task is to chart an alternative way forward. The ﬁrst
step must be to identify the critical elements needed to promote productive
investments and wealth creation in poor rural areas. Our analysis of sys-
temic investment risks in these areas, and experience with market inter-
vention and liberalisation policies, suggests that changes are needed in
institutional arrangements (these changes have to be teased out of practi-
cal experience of ‘what works ’ in facilitating transactions in poor rural
areas), and in political economy and the supply of public goods. We
summarise these below and expound on them in discussion in the follow-
ing section:
A. Necessary changes (primarily) in institutional arrangements :
1. non-market coordination mechanisms to reduce economic coordi-
nation risks in thin markets ;
2. measures to reduce investors’ vulnerability to and risks from price
shocks ;
3. measures to reduce consumers’ vulnerability to and risks from food
price shocks ;
4. measures to reduce investors’ vulnerability to and risks from oppor-
tunism by other actors in the supply chain.
B. Necessary changes (primarily) in the political economy and the supply
of public goods:
5. measures to reduce investors’ vulnerability to and risks from oppor-
tunism by the state and politically powerful rent seekers ;
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6. business opportunities that oﬀer signiﬁcant expected returns to in-
vestors ; it has been argued elsewhere (Kydd et al. 2004) that agriculture
generally oﬀers the best prospects for stimulating broad based, poverty
reducing growth in rural areas in Africa, either through increased
production of tradables that bring income into the area, and/or
through increased and lower cost production of non-tradable staple
foods, but there are important caveats to this including, for example,
technological diﬃculties in raising agricultural productivity in lower
rainfall/lower potential areas ;
7. stable and transparent policies governing macroeconomic management
and government interventions in markets (including ﬁnancial, food and
agricultural input markets) ;
8. improved communications infrastructure in terms of roads and tele-
communications linking rural areas to markets.
This is a long ‘shopping list ’, but these are all necessary elements for
broad based poverty reducing growth. It is striking that, with the excep-
tion of limited cash crop business opportunities in some areas, at present
these elements are largely absent from poor rural areas in Malawi. In-
tegrated rural development projects of the 1970s and early 1980s at-
tempted to take on this ambitious agenda, but largely failed, either because
they were ineﬀective or because they were too expensive to be sustained,
and were abandoned as part of structural adjustment and liberalisation
policies in the late 1980s. How can this agenda be taken up more suc-
cessfully at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century?
W H E R E N E X T? P R I N C I P L E S, P O L I C I E S A N D A C T I O N
There are no simple oﬀ-the-peg answers, but four principles should guide
the search for and design and implementation of eﬀective rural develop-
ment strategies :
$ The ﬁscal costs of rural development must be set against the human, economic and
ﬁnancial costs of development failure, either continuing poverty and sporadic
relief (with unacceptable human costs that were particularly apparent
in the recent crisis but are also evident in high chronic prevalence of
child malnutrition and infant mortality), or indeﬁnite safety nets.
$ Institutional innovation is needed to develop more imaginative solutions that re-
duce risk and promote coordination, sustainable investment, conﬁdence and market
development, addressing the twin problems of state and market failure
that have each bedevilled in diﬀerent ways both the market inter-
vention and the market liberalisation approaches to development.
These are very diﬃcult problems, and we discuss below some ideas as
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to how they might be addressed. The insights from new institutional
economics applied to institutional arrangements and economic co-
ordination may be helpful here, in identifying the precise features in
arrangements that cause them either to succeed or to fail.
$ Policies and interventions should be designed to be ﬂexible and to address and match
the varied and changing opportunities and constraints of diﬀerent areas, with dif-
ferent balances of emphasis between wealth creation and safety nets,
and between diﬀerent opportunities and diﬀerent institutional mech-
anisms in diﬀerent areas. This will involve a phased approach that
seizes opportunities as they arise and is prepared to move forward fast
in areas where the way forward is clearer, while acting more cautiously
where problems are more intractable. Varying emphasis will also be
needed on diﬀerent types of technical change, and diﬀerent technolo-
gies will need diﬀerent types of phased institutional development (see
e.g. Kydd et al. 2001).
$ Policies and interventions should also be mutually consistent and long term, so that
diﬀerent players have time to learn how to operate in a stable economic
and institutional environment, so that they have conﬁdence that in-
vestments will yield returns in the short, medium and long term, and so
that policies and interventions in diﬀerent sectors and diﬀerent areas do
not work against each other. A particularly important issue here is that
short and medium-term interventions focusing on relief and poverty
alleviation should support rather than undermine longer-term policies
and processes of market and wealth creation.
These principles perhaps raise more questions than they answer, with, for
example, critical questions about the types of institutional innovations that
could meet these challenges; about apparently intractable problems in
areas where there are no apparent business opportunities to support
widespread growth; and about contradictory demands for ﬂexible policies
on the one hand and stability and consistency on the other, while charting
new waters in a rapidly changing world with political expediency and
competition for limited resources in dealing with short-term crises. We
brieﬂy address each of these issues in turn.
As noted earlier, weaknesses in the institutional environment are
increasingly prominent in discussions of development policy. Vitally
important though these matters are, our earlier analysis shows that
overcoming weaknesses in the institutional environment will not be
enough to get markets going where there are severe problems of economic
coordination risk : non-market coordination mechanisms are needed to
‘kick-start ’ markets and economic activity (Dorward et al. 2004). The state,
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working together with other stakeholders, has a critical role to play in
supporting mechanisms for coordination between investors, and in re-
ducing investor risk and promoting investor conﬁdence. Macroeconomic
stability and a favourable institutional environment, although arguably
absent from the region for much of the last twenty years or so, are im-
portant in helping to reduce some elements of investor risk and promote
investor conﬁdence. However, they do not deal centrally with the major
issues of coordination, opportunism, and price risks, or of low returns to
investment.
Lines of solution may be found in building on the pockets of past success
with parastatals and of current success with cash crops ; measures that may
be able to simultaneously address coordination and opportunism risks in-
clude regulated monopolies, regional commodity franchises, trader associ-
ations and farmer associations. These may be integrated with measures
that provide some form of insurance for investors and consumers against
price risk. State approaches include the maintenance of grain reserves,
price intervention and guarantees, and market information systems. Non-
state approaches include improvements to market infrastructure and the
development of commodity exchanges and insurance markets. All of these
have well-known and diﬃcult problems related to moral hazard, adverse
selection and governance; and proposals for input, maize or price sub-
sidies have very large budgetary implications. However, there is a growing
body of expertise on diﬀerent ways of managing risk (e.g. Anderson 2001)
and combinations of international, national and local institutions can
often be crafted to reduce these problems (for example, beneﬁts from long-
term mutual commitments to diﬀerent forms of ‘competitive cooperation’
or interlocking arrangements may provide both incentives for comp-
lementary investments and protection from opportunistic behaviour,
Dorward et al. 1998). These problems can only be overcome if govern-
ments and the international community recognise and commit resources
to address these issues in partnership with rural people, businesses, NGOs
and civil society.
A second major diﬃculty is the apparently intractable problem in many
high population areas in identifying proﬁtable activities which could
support widespread poverty reducing growth. In overcrowded areas
in southern Malawi, for example, there are few if any agricultural ac-
tivities that can provide widespread and sustained improved income
opportunities. These areas were largely bypassed by the growth in
maize production supported by the ‘post-independence institutional ﬁx’
(although Evans & Kydd 1990 document some success in the 1980s).
Important though these problems are, they should not hold back action
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that will either support growth in other areas or support limited growth in
these areas, as some growth is better than none, with beneﬁts for poorer
areas in (a) stimulating growth in the economy as awhole (with positive spin-
oﬀs as regards increased demand for labour, growth in the non-farm econ-
omy, and government revenues), and (b) generating experience and ideas
to take forward in the more diﬃcult areas. There is an important related
question here regarding the extent to which attention should be focused
on maize production and markets in its supply chain. Post-independence
policies placed a strong emphasis on maize, due to the heavy reliance on
and preference for maize in rural and urban diets. However, in tending to
ignore root crops and millet, these policies increased reliance on maize
(which is a relatively risky crop in some areas), and failed to develop
technologies and marketing and information systems for other often
locally important crops.
A third diﬃculty with the four principles we propose is the apparent
contradictory demands for ﬂexible policies on the one hand and stability
and consistency on the other. How can stability be achieved in countries
experimenting with policies, responding to crises rather than manag-
ing change, and vulnerable to highly uncertain natural, economic and
donor policy environments? Is stability compatible with radical structural
changes such as land redistribution? There are no simple answers to this,
but again, a ﬁrst step is to recognise the problem, and then to identify
key elements for managing change. These are likely to include emphasis
on transparency and on deliberative mechanisms that establish goals and
rules for responding to and managing change, with checks and balances
that restrain and penalise opportunistic behaviour by governments and
donors (and their agents) as well as other stakeholders. Such mechanisms
inevitably imply some mutual voluntary surrender of sovereignty. ‘Joined
up’ policy formulation processes are also needed to ensure consistency
across diﬀerent areas, across diﬀerent sectors, and across diﬀerent types of
policy (for example relief and development policies, as indicated earlier).
There are also important questions for regional coordination here.
Devereux (2002) notes that price supports and subsidies may be more
problematic now than in the past, as border eﬀects were more limited
when more countries were following similar pricing policies. Better re-
gional market and policy integration might also play an important role
in reducing price risks.
: : :
The recent food crisis in Malawi and elsewhere in central-southern Africa
has drawn stark attention to the failures of development policies over the
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last forty years to create wealth and develop a robust economy, or the
markets on which such an economy must depend. Market intervention
and market liberalisation policies have both failed, in diﬀerent ways, to
address fundamental coordination problems in market development.
These failures can be attributed, in part at least, to a certain degree of
naivety about the weaknesses of government and of markets. Looking
forward, we now have a better understanding of these weaknesses, and of
ways in which they may be addressed. However, the task is in other ways
more diﬃcult than it was twenty or thirty years ago, as there is more
pressure on limited natural resources, the global environment is perhaps
more diﬃcult now than it was, and there are severe challenges from de-
capitalisation and decline, and from the impacts of HIV/AIDS. These
diﬃculties should not, however, be an excuse for inaction: the recent food
crisis must be a stimulus to concerted and committed action to learn from
the lessons of the past, and to develop and implement consistent policies
that will support development of the fundamentals of a working economy.
This will require long-term investment in institution building, a willingness
to radically rethink current market liberalisation policies and consider
costly interventions to make farming proﬁtable, and a willingness by all
stakeholders (and particularly governments and donors) to commit them-
selves to pragmatic partnerships that by developing trust allow them to
surrender some of their sovereignty and take risks, in the hope of achieving
wider gains.
N O T E S
1. An earlier version of this paper was originally presented at ‘Malawi after Banda: perspectives in a
regional African context’, a conference to mark the retirement of John McCracken, 4–5 September
2002, Centre of Commonwealth Studies, University of Stirling. The work draws on various pieces of
work commissioned by the UK Department for International Development ; however the ﬁndings,
interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and should not
be attributed to the Department for International Development, which does not guarantee their
accuracy and can accept no responsibility for any consequences of their use. We gratefully acknowl-
edge helpful comments on the development and revision of this paper from colleagues in Imperial
College London and from two anonymous reviewers.
2. The data reported here are taken from a variety of sources, all located in January 2004
on the World Bank website. These sources, which were not entirely mutually consistent, included:
devdata.worldbank.org/idg/ and devdata.worldbank.org/CPproﬁle.
3. The estate sector has three main crops: tobacco, sugar and tea, with tobacco being much the
most important. Tea production is limited by rainfall requirements and most suitable land is already
planted. Sugar is limited by quotas into high value markets. At the beginning of the 1990s, the largest
sub-component of tobacco estate tobacco was burley, produced under a form of sharecropping called
the ‘visiting tenant system’. This depended critically on legal prohibition on smallholders (potential
tenants) growing burley on their own customary land, a prohibition which was removed with the
liberalisation of the early 1990s. This had the eﬀect of transferring much of the burley industry to the
smallholder sector, a highly desirable outcome in terms of income distribution, but one which severely
undermined the proﬁtability of most burley estates. The best estates could still attract good tenants,
because of the relatively high incomes available.
T H E MA L AW I 2002 FOOD CR I S I S 359
4. HIV/AIDS adult seroprevalence is estimated at 15%, and the number of children orphaned by
AIDS at 470,000; see devdata.worldbank.org/idg/
5. The terms ‘ low level equilibrium trap’ and ‘underdevelopment equilibrium’ are virtually inter-
changeable. Hoﬀ (2000) gives an account of the origins of the concept, starting with Rodenstein-Rodan
in 1943 and developed in the works of Nurkse, Myrdal and Hirschman. The essence of the idea is that
the widespread existence of spillovers/externalities and the need for certain critical public goods
means that, at the early stages of development, sustained economic growth will be very diﬃcult to
achieve without government intervention to fund public goods and undertake the necessary coordi-
nation to push the economy out of the trap. Modern formulations of low level equilibrium traps stress
that they can persist and prove intractable in the face of positive individual changes such as : improved
export prices, technological ‘ silver bullets ’ and ‘good mutations’ of current institutional arrangements.
6. In addition to these very practical problems facing private sector led agricultural development,
wider political motives were very important for the development of parastatals. There was often a deep
mistrust of private companies seen to be dominated by or associated with former colonial interests, and
often a socialist philosophy suspicious of the private sector and of markets, with a belief in the need for
the state to actively intervene to direct the economy to achieve both productive and welfare objectives.
At the same time there was great conﬁdence in the ability of the state ; and economic development
theories that stressed the importance of industrial sector development, and the taxation of agriculture
to ﬁnance this, found state involvement in agricultural marketing activities a convenient tool for such
taxation. In Malawi in particular the parastatal system was linked to the development of the autocratic
one party state.
7. This success in credit was partly due to the prevailing institutional environment (i.e. the ‘hard
state ’ of President Banda) with conﬁscation of property of defaulters. While this was important in
encouraging repayment for households facing particular crises or otherwise tempted to default for
short-term gain, we hold that other aspects of the institutional arrangements themselves strongly
discouraged farmers with longer-term horizons from defecting on credit contracts. These institutional
arrangements included mutually guaranteeing credit groups subject to the sanction of the closure of
poorly performing groups. The incentive to be a member of a group with a good credit record was not
only access to ﬁnance, but also access to assistance by extension workers with the logistics of produce
marketing and, more importantly, often rationed input supply.
8. By contrast the burden of subsidies, loan defaults and price controls in Zimbabwe and Zambia
led to unsustainable drains on government ﬁscal resources, and, with increasing cash ﬂow problems,
inability to deliver eﬀective services.
9. In Zimbabwe, for example, Natural Regions IV and V were largely excluded from the beneﬁts of
the maize revolution (Poulton et al. 2002). In Malawi the Central and Northern Regions, where land
pressure and poverty rates are lower, gained more from these policies than the Southern Region,
where land pressure and poverty are higher.
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